Analysis: Why a “quick and clean” US attack on Iran won’t be easy | Conflict news & more related news here

Illiberal systems often seem most permanent just before they change. But moments of upheaval can also produce a different illusion: that the system is one dramatic external shock away from collapse. With Iran convulsed by unprecedented protests against the country’s leadership, it is tempting to imagine that US air power could provide the final push.

That temptation misunderstands how the Islamic Republic actually survives. Coercive cohesion is the cement of the system: the ability of parallel political and security institutions to continue acting together even as legitimacy erodes. When this cohesion is maintained, the system absorbs the impacts that more conventional states would suffer.

Iran is not a single pyramid with a single man at the top. It is a heterarchical and networked state: overlapping power centers around the office of the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guard, intelligence bodies, administrative gatekeepers and a clientelism economy. In such a system, removing a node, even the most symbolic one, does not reliably collapse the structure; Redundancy and substitute chains of command are a design feature. Beheading – a prominent narrative after US President Donald Trump’s tactical “success” in Venezuela – therefore seems less of a strategy and more of a gamble on chaos.

That is why Trump’s dilemma is important. He is among the neocon hawks who want regime change by force and an America First base that will not support protracted wars, post-conflict stabilization or other Middle East adventures. Instinct, therefore, is a quick punishment that seems decisive without creating obligations.

Regional politics further narrows Trump’s menu. Israel wants Washington to do the heavy lifting against Tehran. Key Gulf interlocutors, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, have pushed for de-escalation and diplomacy. Operationally, a lack of Gulf support for a new campaign could push the United States toward remotely launched military options, making sustained air operations more difficult to sustain.

Trump has also locked himself in rhetorically. Warning that if Iran “violently kills peaceful protesters” the United States would “come to their rescue,” he has had to point to credible military options even as he suggests diplomacy is preferable and hints that the killings are “stopping.” In practice, this oscillation appears to be less strategic ambiguity and more negotiation and indecision, encouraging all factions around them to believe they can still win the argument.

It is important to be clear about what Washington’s inner circle seems to want. The goal is not liberal democracy. The prize is a pragmatic Iran that can be drawn into a regional geoeconomic framework, open to business with the United States and away from excessive dependence on China. This implies limitations on nuclear activity, some restrictions on ballistic missiles and a reduction – real or cosmetic – of Iran’s support for the so-called “axis of resistance.” This is a transformation of posture, not a total replacement of the Islamic Republic.

Air power can punish and point. It can degrade specific installations. It may increase the cost of repression by authorities. But it cannot reorganize a security sector, arbitrate succession or generate behavioral change. And it cannot protect protesters from the air. Libya in 2011 remains a warning. Military force, at best, is a high-risk attempt to force the Iranians to the negotiating table, which will likely backfire.

The most plausible military scenario is limited punitive strikes, using cruise missiles and long-range munitions against Iranian Revolutionary Guard centers or enabling infrastructure. This fits the preference for “quick and clean” and can be framed as punishment rather than war. Its strategic disadvantage is that it hands the Guards an “existential threat” narrative that can legitimize harsher repression, while increasing the risk of retaliation through proxies, disruption of shipping, and pressure on US bases in the Gulf. It can also reduce the possibility of internal fragmentation by pushing rival factions to unite around the flag.

An attempted “decapitation” of leadership is more cinematic and less believable. It is the most scalable option, which is likely to unify hardliners and is still unlikely to collapse a networked system.

A sustained air campaign is the least plausible and the most dangerous. Without bases or overflights in the Gulf, logistics drives operations to more distant platforms and a smaller generation of sorties. Politically, it would violate the premise of America first; Strategically, it would internationalize the crisis, expand the battlefield, and invite a cycle of tit-for-tat escalation that neither side can reliably control.

Cyber ​​and electronic disruption belongs to a different category: lower visibility, sometimes deniable, and potentially compatible with Gulf preferences to avoid open war. But the effects are uncertain and often temporary, and a networked state can prevent disruption. The most realistic outcome is that cyber operations could accompany other measures, but are unlikely to generate decisive political change on their own.

The deeper point is that external shocks rarely produce the specific domestic outcome Washington says it wants: a pragmatic transition at the top. Strong external pressure often hardens the coercive core of a system, because escalating violence is not always synonymous with trust; frequently it is panic when wearing a uniform. The only lasting trigger for transformation is internal: fractures within the security services or elite divisions that create competing centers of authority with incompatible survival strategies.

If the United States wants to influence that dynamic, it should focus on levers that shape cohesion rather than dramatic bombings. Maintain deterrence against mass killings but avoid promising a “rescue” that cannot be achieved without war. Calibrate economic pressure on individuals and entities driving violence while leaving credible exit routes for technocrats and pragmatists who might prefer de-escalation and negotiation. Above all, coordinate with America’s friends in the region, the head of all Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia, who can limit escalation and translate coercive discourse into negotiating space.

The Islamic Republic can still crush this round of protests. It can also reorganize itself internally and survive in a new form. But the anger on the streets cannot be controlled unless sanctions are lifted and the economy is transformed. To do this, the regime needs to move from a theocratic paralysis to a more pragmatic system.